**CLASS NOTES 9/15**

Boko Haram Insurgency—operation safe corridor and its challenges.

Intro

· Armed conflicts, pre-cold war=states, now it’s non-state actors. Previously only in Basque Country (Spain), Middle East, Northern Ireland, but it’s on the rise after 9/11/Arab Spring

o Al-qaeda

o Hezbollah

o ISIS

o Hamas

o Taliban

· Africa not separate from the madness—al-shabab, central African republic groups, Mali/Maghreb, Congo

· Independence 1960, Civil Wat 1967-70

o Biafra movement and controversy in Niger Delta. Most recently, book haram (2002)

· Terrible crisis for socio-economic, humanitarian efforts, etc.

· Adamawa, Yobe, Bornu (NE region)—loss of livelihood, amenities

o Spread into neighbor country

o Intl security problem

· Many govt measures—FGN victims support fund—comm for rehab, comm for reintegration

o Also military measures, Op Lafiya Dole

o Decimated book Haram capabilities as a result, people are surrendering.

· Sept 2015—Op state corridor—avenue to surrender and return to society. Catalyst for peace process. Examine insurgency and challenges of safe corridor

SCOPE

· Definition of concept of insurgency

o Insurgency—form of rebellion with support of lrge population, civil disobedience encouraged. Also defined by DOD—organized movement of aim with subversive means. Unlawful means to achieve an end (state). Resist/oppose execution of law/stateà attack constitutes an attack on defenseless citizens, drives businesses away

§ Two types—classical, contemporary

o Terrorism—state/group of states—means by which to convey message to audience, premeditated violence, anxiety0inducing metric of violence by semi0clandestine group

o 8 types, but largely funneled into domestic and international

o book haram—salafist group become jihadist in 2009—hausa wordsà western education is forbidden

o just now getting used to female suicide bombers

· Manifestation—emerged in response to sharia law in N. states

· response

· Between 2003-2009, book haram growing strong, activities prominent in Adamawa, Bronu, Gombe, Bauchi, Kaduno, Kogi—Sokoto

· Cameroon, chad, and niger all seeing aftershocks

· Death of yusuf, Shekau

· 2014—attack armu barracks in Abuja nad Bauchi and headquarters in Kaduna and UN building

· responsible for the death of over 3000 civilians—cost location millions of dollars

· 279 girls kidnapped Chibok, borno state

o girls mostly drugged and forced to go on suicide missions.

· also ISIS accepted allegiance and named it the ISWAP

· july 2014—declared 27 LGAs—Bornu, Yobe, Adamawa (Caliphate declared, I think)

o sect engaged in IEDs on supply routes to slow responses

RESPONSES

· UN, au, ecowas AND LCBC taking steps to fight

· FGN and governments also instituted efforts

· UN response

o Resolution 1267—sanction Boko Haram

o UNHCR funding appeal for 174.4m to be raised to help with refugees

· Friendly nations

o UK providing 32m to help deliver basic life-saving measures including nutrition, food security, water, sanitation, protection of civilian victims.

o US helping in the north to build capacity and designated it a Global Terrorist Org

o France is assisting as well—military effort

o All helping with intelligence and reconnaissance

· French gov facilitated global and regional action plan summit

o To deal with remnants of book haram—agree to share intelligence, maintain military presence around Lake chad, build capacity

· AU

o Leaders condemned BH activities on particular and continent at large

o Heads of state consented to deployment of 7500 all ranks under MNJTF

· Local responses

o Local efforts working to reintegrate those coming back?

· Civil responses

o victim support fund—for rehab of victims in the Northeast

o MNJTF. President also working to gain global fight for this support. Beginning to be fruitful with more intl support available.

o Assessing requirement for those to rehab and return home

o Infrastructures being fixed to encourage folks to come back.

o Reconstructions of communities and states.

· Military response.

o “restore order one”

o restore order 3—these were independent of one another, but expanded in scope

o 2015—effort reorganized Op Lafiya Dole

o All states badly affected by BH.

o People are clearing remnants of insurgents, many scattered into the bushes.

OPERATION SAFE CORRIDOR

· Initiative of fed gov of Nigeria

· Primary objective is to facilitate easy access and passage for surrendering insurgents to security forces for subsequent DDR

· Mandate

o Identify implementation partners/stakeholders and establish responsibilities

o Establish framework for coordination of implementation agencies

o Determine funding reqs and sources

o Broad strategy, and more

· Actions

o DIA operatives profile surrendered combatants and IDPs in conjeunction with Op LDand NEMA respectively

o Kept in safe custody under best world practices

o Constituted committee to work out modalities for the immediate implementation of op safe corridor to deradicalize, rehab, and reintegrate

· Modality committee

o Jigawa state govt as permanent ddr camp

o And much more

· Challenges of operation SC

o Public perceptions

§ Mixed response—govt not set proper stage for it. Should grant amnesty to give leeway to DDR program. Govt will need to consider with existing statutes and opinions of this nature.

o Sanctions/restriction on BH

§ 1276 on sanction list. These sanctions are binding on the sect. these will inhibit any action including Op Safe corridor

§ mentioned in USAID program—limit its capacity to reach full potential, because need people to come in and help.

§ People want to help, but can’t do it because of binding sanctions affecting international organizations

o Legal status of ex-combatants

§ Concerns raised about legal status—heinous crimes. Amnesty?

o Sensitivity of local pop

§ Challenge in northeast. General repulsive attitude to BH based on past, but people are desperate for peace. Consciously executed keeping this in perspective all times. Lots of local leaders consulted. Regional outreach is ongoing (media)

· Radio, dropping flags, all different languages, to sensitize population as best they can. “must learn to forgive”—same thing in Sierra Leone. But more outreach is happening from outside resources.

· Three big affected states are getting financial incentives, but the sanctions are tying them down.

· Forgiveness is basis of reintegration.

o Security.

§ BH attacked various locations, many in prisons around country

§ Govt working to beef up all locations and supplying a camp

§ Info from boys who have surrendered has helped in shutting down BH—if they attack anyone first, it’s the people who snitched.

§ Can’t say how many.

§ Now attacking everyone in the region—regional problem, not Nigerian problem. Now other countries have shut borders, and everyone is stuck—more likely to lay down arms.

§ Safe corridor camp is one camp. Designated points to surrender, and then they are moved/profiled, flown to camp (12 weeks of rehab). Expected to have learned, and that should serve them.

§ Farming, carpentry.

§ Is there counseling? Yes. 27 government agencies. Some immigration, women committees, all working on DDR program.

§ Sit and assess each combatant, if they aren’t ready, they start again.

§ Pakistan comes and helps challenges them on the tenets of Islam

§ Is justice part of this? Some confess, but can’t bring criminal charges. Goal is to reform them. As of now, no amnesty and pardon.

o What happens after 12 weeks? Settlements all over Nigeria. Don’t go back home for 5 years—small pension for govt to live

o Does this incentivize people to be radicals? Because of what BH is, no one wants to associate with them bc of the stigma.

§ In Niger delta, that happened, but not in the north.

· Camp can take about 1000. How many are out there?

· 80% male, remaining women and children (not fighters). Will they be reintegrated together? Yes, but kept separately at camp?

(a few questions I missed to type earlier notes)

· Sanctions—the men being rehabilitated are Boko Haram—even though it’s not on state on Nigeria

· If he goes to IMF—what are you using this money for? And if you mention Boko Haram, they bring in resolution, and they bring out the resolution, and say “the sanction says no.”

· What about other reasons not to invest? Corruption?

· Perception of military running operation

o “we aren’t running it—we’re only involved bc in a conflict zone”—won’t surrender to civilians. They only secure the camp.

o Not trained to deradicalize people.

· Thus far govt has been the ones funding—until we get intl governments—everything is run by them.

· Joint task force has been very effective thus far—all can work together to corner and trap the groups. They hope it remains so that it can be transferred to Lake Chad region, so it is a standing army.

· Is there follow-up? They choose their trade—they’ve all been profiled. For each to which they go, there’s a monitoring problem. National monitoring agency. It’s their job—they have essentially parole officers, and they report back to the camp. Minimum five years right now.

o A few tried to go back to communities and were killed because of their actions.

· Starving them out gradually—slowly getting more—hoping after 6 months all DDR will be done (everyone will have surrendered), after summer holidays.

· Child soldiers—haven’t had any….hmmm….

· Creation/expansion of BH—what led to it? Religion is major driver. Want to create caliphate/territory where their beliefs trump, radical islam. Peaceful protests didn’t work, and when leader killed, big shift.

o Shekau’s BH is different—kills anything he sees. Used to be, don’t kill muslims. It’s an ideology.

o Poverty is everywhere too.

Were there no other alternatives? And is something being done to combat that, as in presenting other alternatives?

· Ideology –shielded from the world, and it’s an easy black/white

What’s the proportion of people being “held back” in the 12 week program

· Using Saudi Arabian model

· 12 weeks is the minimum required time. After 12 weeks, reassess 20-30% need to go through again

· have to sign declaration to be prosecuted if they recidivate

same language—many from same region

are they still invested in religious radicalism? If so, is it part of the program?

· Yes, it’s main thrust of the program

· Religious scholars, and folks from Pakistan, all trained abroad.

Play “good teachings of quran” on the loudspeaker

Standards for entering back into society

· psychological testing on an ad hoc basis, with everyone working together and the national monitoring system, they are cautiously optimistic with the results.

Communities that they are reintegrated into

· t’s not easy. Lots of stigma, no one wants to have anything to do with them, so they need to keep working with traditional rulers

Are they from any particular sect? if they’re coming from different groups, different process?

· No, same.

What help does Nigeria need from the US? And could operation safe corridor be the model for rehabilitation? And what would need to be done to make it so.

· It’s already a model bc we have achieved a lot. Just since march. Started from nothing.

· Reintegration is complex. We have learned from Colombia, Saudi arabia. Average Nigerian would strap a bomb to themselves. And yes, there must be incentives for them to get there.

· That has helped—better part of life, after being conscripted.

· The sanctions from the UN have to go. Many sectors struggling. Not the money, just for people to be able to come to the camp, so they can consult on the problems and benefits that they already have.

· And based on that, we will need to expand.

What about the justice demand?

· If you say you want to prosecute, it’s like suffering both ways. Double edged sword.

· It’s also a mechanism of inequality

· Criminal prosecution not conjoined with DDR—only for those who do not surrender.

· So, being a member is not a crime—if you surrender, initial amnesty. You need evidence for criminal prosecution, if you are a captured combatant. Like germany model, Nuremberg.